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This paper introduces a subcalculus for general set functions and
uses this framework to study the core of TU games. After stating a
linearity theorem, we establish several theorems that characterize mea-
sure games having ￿nite-dimensional cores. This is a very tractable
class of games relevant in many economic applications. Finally, we
show that exact games with ￿nite dimensional cores are generalized
linear production games.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
General set functions, not necessarily additive, are widely used in mathemat-
ical economics. In cooperative game theory, the key notion of transferable
utility (TU) game is modelled as a general set function ν de￿n e do nac o l -
lection Σ of admissible coalitions, with the only requirement on ν that it
1takes on value zero at the empty set. In decision theory, non-additive set
functions have been recently used to model ￿vague￿ beliefs, which in gen-
eral are not representable by standard additive probabilities (see Schmeidler,
1989). Though the motivation is very diﬀerent, the mathematical object is
essentially the same in both cases.
This has motivated a large literature on non-additive set functions in
both game and decision theory, that includes the classic book of Aumann and
Shapley (1974). In mathematics as well, non-additive set functions have been
the subject of many investigations, mostly in the wake of the seminal work
of Choquet (1953), which anticipated most of the themes of the subsequent
literature.
Rather surprisingly, in these diﬀerent strands of literature there has been
little attempt to develop a systematic calculus and subcalculus for general
set functions, despite of the potential insights that such basic mathematical
tools could provide. Recently, Epstein and Marinacci (2000) have developed a
calculus for TU games, in which the derivative is an additive set function that
suitably approximates the TU game on ￿small￿ sets. This derivative is then
used to study the core of TU games. In their analysis a key role is played by
linear sets (coalitions), namely sets E in Σ such that ν (E)+ν (Ec)=ν (Ω),
where Ω is the grand coalition. Naturally, the empty set ∅ and the grand
coalition Ω are linear sets. They show that, under mild assumptions, the
core shrinks to a singleton as long as the game is diﬀerentiable at some linear
set. Moreover, the core consists of the derivative itself.
A limitation of their analysis is that the core may not be a singleton.
This naturally leads to the question of whether it is possible to extend their
approach by using superdiﬀerentials rather than diﬀerentials. This is our
purpose in the present work, where a subcalculus for TU games is introduced
and exploited to characterize cores of TU games.
Our starting point was the discovery of a simple characterization of the
cores by means of superdiﬀerentials. As a matter of fact, let ∂ν(E) be
the natural adaptation for TU games of the standard superdiﬀerential of
functions on Euclidean spaces. For the core of a TU game ν it holds
core(ν)=∂ν(E) ∩ ∂ν(E
c),
where E is any linear set (Theorem 10). Based on this simple characterization
we are able to prove several novel results and to provide simple proofs and
a unifying framework for some important known results. In particular, our
2￿subcalculus￿ framework is the natural setting in which some of the powerful
methods of Convex Analysis can be used to study TU games.
More speci￿cally, our paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we discuss
the main properties of the superdiﬀerentials. They turn out to be similar to
those of the standard superdiﬀerentials, though the notions are less close than
one might think at a ￿rst sight. Among them, it is especially important the
sum rule for convex games, which ensures that ∂ (ν1 + ν2)(E)=∂ν1 (E)+
∂ν2 (E) for all sets E in Σ. An immediate consequence of this rule is that the
cores of convex games are stable under summation, that is, core(ν1 + ν2)=
core(ν1)+core(ν2).
After having established a ￿subcalculus,￿ Section 4 studies the relations
existing among our superdiﬀerentials, the derivatives studied by Epstein and
Marinacci (2000), and the cores. The main result, Theorem 12, provides con-
ditions ensuring that the core shrinks to a singleton as long as the diﬀerential
of the game belongs to its superdiﬀerential. This result can be viewed as an
enrichment of the theory developed by Epstein and Marinacci (2000).
In Section 5 we specialize our analysis to measure games. As a matter
of fact, TU games that are relevant for economic applications have often the
form ν = g (P),w h e r eP =( P1,...,PN):Σ → RN is a nonatomic vector
measure and g : RN → R is a function such that ν (E)=g (P (E)) for all
sets E belonging to Σ. Games of this form are called measure games,a n d
standard examples include exchange economies with transferable utilities and
models of production technology. While we do not expatiate here on these
known issues, we refer the reader to Aumann and Shapley (1974) and Hart
and Neyman (1988) for detailed discussions of these examples and of the
relevance of measure games in economic applications.
Section 6 is entirely devoted to linear measure games. Since, in general,
the cores of TU games are large and diﬃcult to describe, it is important to
consider games having tractable cores. Based on our subcalculus, we provide
simple conditions under which the cores of measure games consist of linear
combinations
PN
i=1 αiPi of the components {Pi}
N
i=1 of the underlying vector
measure P. For example, we show that the cores have this form whenever
there exists a linear and radial set E ∈ Σ, that is, a linear set E such that
P (E) belongs to the relative interior of R(P), the range {P (E):E ∈ Σ} ⊆
RN of the vector measure P. The existence of linear and radial sets is a
conditions often satis￿ed by economic games of the form g (P). In fact, these
games typically feature some homogeneity condition of the function g,a n d
it will be seen that even very mild homogeneity conditions deliver linear and
3radial sets.
Our results of this section generalize well-known results of Billera and
Raanan (1981), as well as recent results of Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz
(1999). They are based on a novel linearity theorem for nonatomic vec-
tor measures (Theorem 20) that should be of independent interest. This
theorem relies on results from both measure theory and convex analysis, an
interplay made possible by the Lyapunov Theorem, which guarantees that
the range R(P) is a convex set.
In Section 7 we consider general games, not necessarily measure ones, that
have ￿nite-dimensional cores. The main result of the section shows that an
exact game has a ￿nite-dimensional core if and only if it is a generalized linear
production games, a very tractable class of measure games introduced in
Section 6. This result is interesting because many economic games have ￿nite-
dimensional cores (see Hart and Neyman, 1988), and our characterization
shows that, when exact, all these games are nothing but generalized linear
production games.
Finally, in the Concluding Remarks we discuss the related works of Billera
and Raanan (1981) and Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (1999), as well as the
relationships between linear cores and semi-in￿nite linear programming. The
Appendix gathers some technical lemmas and lengthy proofs.
2P r e l i m i n a r i e s
Throughout the paper, Ω is the set of players and Σ is the σ-algebra of
admissible coalitions. Subsets of Ω a r eu n d e r s t o o dt ob ei nΣ even where not
stated explicitly.
A set function ν : Σ → R is a game if ν (∅)=0 . A game ν is
positive if ν (E) ≥ 0 for all E,
bounded if supE∈Σ|ν (E)| < ∞.
monotone if ν (E) ≥ ν (E0) whenever E0 ⊆ E,
superadditive if ν (E ∪ E0) ≥ ν (E)+ν (E0) for all pairwise disjoint sets E
and E0,
supermodular (or convex) if ν (E ∪ E0)+ν (E ∪ E0) ≥ ν (E)+ν (E0) for all
sets E and E0,
4additive (or a charge) if ν (E ∪ E0)=ν (E)+ν (E0) for all pairwise disjoint
sets E and E0,




i=1 ν (Ei) for all count-
able collections of pairwise disjoint sets {Ei}
∞
i=1.
Unless otherwise stated, charges and measures are understood to be
signed. The set of all charges (measures) that are bounded with respect
to the variation norm is denoted by ba(Ω) (ca(Ω)). Generic elements of
ba(Ω) are denoted by m, while its nonnegative elements are denoted by P.
Ac h a r g em is non-atomic if for all m(E) 6=0there exists B ⊆ E such
that m(B) 6=0and m(E − B) 6=0 .I t i s strongly continuous if, for every
ε > 0, there exists a partition {E1,...,En} of Ω in Σ such that |m|(Ei) ≤
ε for all i = 1,...,n. A strongly continuous charge is non-atomic, while
the converse holds only for measures (see Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao
(1982)). Let m =( m1,...,mN):Σ → RN be a vector charge. If each mi
is strongly continuous, then by the Lyapunov Theorem the range R(m)=
{m(A):A ∈ Σ} is a convex subset of RN (see Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara
Rao (1982)).
The game ν : Σ → R is a measure game if there exists a positive vector
charge P =( P1,...,PN):Σ → RN
+,w i t he a c hPi : Σ → R+ bounded and
strongly continuous, and a function g : R(P) → R such that
ν (E)=g (P (E)) for all E ∈ Σ.
When N = 1, ν = g (P) is called a scalar measure game.
The core of a game ν is
core(ν)={m ∈ ba(Ω):m(Ω)=ν (Ω) and m(E) ≥ ν(E) for all E ∈ Σ}.
If the game is bounded, the core is w∗-compact by the Nikodym boundedness
theorem (see, e.g., Diestel (1984) p. 80). A game ν is exact if core(ν) 6= ∅
and ν (E)=m i n m∈core(ν) m(E) for all E ∈ Σ.A l lp o s i t i v ec o n v e xg a m e sa r e
exact (see Schmeidler, 1972).
Given a game ν : Σ → R,as e tE is linear if ν (E)+ν (Ec)=ν (Ω).
Notice that both Ω and ∅ are linear sets. Moreover, when core(ν) 6= ∅, E is
linear if and only if ν (E)+ν (Ec) ≥ ν (Ω). The set of linear sets is denoted
by A.
Linear sets are delivered by eﬃcient coalition structures, that is, at most
countable partitions {Ei}i∈I of Ω such that
P
i∈I ν (Ei)=ν (Ω).I nf a c t ,i f
5ν is superadditive and either ν is continuous or the partition is ￿nite, then
Ei is linear for each i in I (see Epstein and Marinacci (2000)).1
We close by reporting the notion of derivative for games studied by Ep-
stein and Marinacci (2000). For any A ∈ Σ,l e t
'
Aj,λ“nλ
j=1 be a ￿nite partition
of A.D e n o t eb y
'
Aj,λ“
λ the net of all ￿nite partitions of A,w h e r eλ
0 > λ
implies that the partition corresponding to λ
0 re￿nes that corresponding to
λ.
De￿nition 1 Ag a m eν : Σ → R is diﬀerentiable at E ∈ Σ if there exists a




















This de￿nition is slightly diﬀerent from that of Epstein and Marinacci
(2000), which originates in Epstein (1999), as we do not require the charge
δν(•;E) to be convex-ranged.
3S u p e r d i ﬀerentials
De￿nition 2 Ag a m eν : Σ → R is superdiﬀerentiable at E ∈ Σ if there
exists a charge m ∈ ba(Ω) such that
ν (A) ≤ ν (E)+m(A) − m(E) (1)
for each A ∈ Σ.
The charges m that satisfy Eq. (1) are called supergradients and ∂ν(E)
is the superdiﬀerential of ν, that is, the (possibly empty) set of all supergra-
dients.
De￿nition 2 is the natural adaptation to our setting of the standard no-
tion of superdiﬀerential of real-valued functions (see Rockafellar, 1970),2 as it
becomes evident by considering measure games g (P):Σ → R.R e c a l lt h a t ,
1In a ￿nite setting, eﬃcient coalition structures have been introduced by Aumann and
Dreze (1974).
2Fujishige (1991) gives a similar de￿nition for supermodular functions de￿ned on ￿nite
distributive lattices.
6given a subset A ⊆ RN (e.g., A = R(P)), a function g : A → R is superdif-
ferentiable at x0 ∈ A if there is a vector χ ∈ RN, called supergradient,s u c h
that g (x0) ≤ g (x)+χ • (x − x0) for all x ∈ A.T h esuperdiﬀerential ∂g (x0)
is the set of all supergradients.
Given a set E, the two superdiﬀerentials ∂ν(E) and ∂g(P (E)) are related
by the following simple lemma, that we report for later reference.
Lemma 3 Given a measure game ν = g (P):Σ → R,f o re a c hs e tE ∈ Σ a
charge of the form χ • P belongs to ∂ν(E) if and only if the vector χ ∈ RN
belongs to ∂g (P (E)).
Proof. The ￿if￿ part is trivial. As to the converse, suppose χ • P ∈ ∂ν(E).
By de￿nition, for all A ∈ Σ we have:
g (P (A)) ≤ g (P (E))+χ•P (A)−χ•P (E)=g (P (E))+χ•[P (A) − P (E)],
as desired.
We now present few elementary properties of the superdiﬀerential ∂ν(E).
It is easy to check that the set ∂ν(E) is convex and weak∗-closed, and that
the following properties hold:
(i) ∂λν(E)=λ∂ν (E) for all λ > 0 and all E ∈ Σ.
(ii) ∂ν1 (E)+∂ν2 (E) ⊆ ∂ (ν1 + ν2)(E) for all E ∈ Σ and all games ν1 and
ν2, with equality if at least one of the two games is in ba(Ω).
Given E ∈ Σ, consider the cone KE de￿ned by
KE = {m ∈ ba(Ω): m(G) ≥ 0 and m(F) ≤ 0 for each F ⊆ E
c and G ⊆ E}.
Clearly, KΩ = ba(Ω)
+ and −KE = KEc.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra l lm ∈ KE and all
A ∈ Σ we have m+ (A)=m(A ∩ E) and m− (A)=−m(A ∩ Ec),a n ds o
kmk =2 m(E) − m(Ω). The following result shows the importance of these
cones for our analysis.
Proposition 4 Let ν : Σ → R be a game superdiﬀerentiable at E.T h e n ,
∂ν(E)=∂ν(E)+KEc for each E ∈ Σ.
7Proof. The inclusion ∂ν(E) ⊆ ∂ν(E)+KEc is obvious. As to the opposite
inclusion, let m ∈ ∂ν(E)+KEc. Then, for suitable m1 ∈ ∂ν(E) and m2 ∈
KEc,w eh a v e ,f o ra l lA ∈ Σ,
ν (E)+m(A) − m(E)=ν (E)+m1 (A)+m2 (A) − m1 (E) − m2 (E)
≥ ν (A)+m2 (A) − m2 (E)
= ν (A)+m2 (E
c ∩ A) − m2 (E ∩ A
c) ≥ ν (A),
and so m ∈ ∂ν(E).
We now consider two key properties of superdiﬀerentials, nonemptiness
and the sum rule. Our ￿rst result shows that for the important class of exact
games the set ∂ν(E) is nonempty for all E ∈ Σ.
Proposition 5 If the game ν : Σ → R is exact, then ∂ν(E) 6= ∅ for all
E ∈ Σ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,ν is exact if and only if ∂ν(E) ∩ core(ν) 6= ∅ for all
E ∈ Σ.
Proof. Let ν be exact and let E ∈ Σ.B y d e ￿nition, there exists m ∈
core(ν) such that m(E)=ν (E).S i n c e m(A) ≥ ν (A) for all A ∈ Σ,
it follows that m ∈ ∂ν(E),a n ds o∂ν(E) ∩ core(ν) 6= ∅.C o n v e r s e l y ,
suppose that ∂ν(E) ∩ core(ν) 6= ∅ for each E ∈ Σ. It is easy to check that
m ∈ ∂ν(E) ∩ core(ν) implies m(E)=ν (E),a n ds oν is exact.
Since positive convex games are exact, they are superdiﬀerentiable at all
sets E ∈ Σ by Proposition 5. The next result provides a simple extension
of this result to real-valued convex games, thus providing a condition under
which real-valued convex games are everywhere superdiﬀerentiable.
Proposition 6 Ab o u n d e dg a m eν : Σ → R is convex if and only if ∂ν(E1)∩
∂ν(E2) 6= ∅ for every pair E1 ⊆ E2.
The next result shows that superdiﬀerentials preserve sums.
Theorem 7 Given any two convex and bounded games ν1 : Σ → R and
ν2 : Σ → R,w eh a v e
∂ (ν1 + ν2)(E)=∂ν1 (E)+∂ν2 (E), (2)
for all E ∈ Σ.
8Since ∂λν(E)=λ∂ν (E) for all λ > 0 and all sets E,w ec o n c l u d et h a t ,
by Theorem 7, superdiﬀerentials of bounded convex games preserve positive
linear combinations. This fundamental property immediately implies the
following interesting result, which shows that cores of bounded convex games
are stable under summation.
Corollary 8 Let ν1 : Σ → R and ν2 : Σ → R be any two convex and bounded
games. If ν1 and ν2 have nonempty cores, then
core(ν1 + ν2)=core(ν1)+core(ν2).
Proof. The nontrivial inclusion to prove is core(ν1 + ν2) ⊆ core(ν1)+
core(ν2).L e tm ∈ core(ν1 + ν2). Clearly, m ∈ ∂ (ν1 + ν2)(∅) and m(Ω)=
(ν1 + ν2)(Ω).B y P r o p o s i t i o n 7 , m ∈ ∂ν1 (∅)+∂ν1 (∅).H e n c e , t h e r e a r e
m1 ∈ ∂ν1 (∅) and m2 ∈ ∂ν2 (∅) such that m = m1 + m2.B y d e ￿nition,
m1 ≥ ν1 and m2 ≥ ν2. Hence, m(Ω)=( ν1 + ν2)(Ω) implies m1 (Ω)=ν (Ω)
and m2 (Ω)=ν (Ω). We conclude that m1 ∈ core(ν1) and m2 ∈ core(ν2),
and so m ∈ core(ν1)+core(ν2).
We close by considering measure games. In this case it is enough to study
the existence of the standard superdiﬀerential ∂g (P (E)) since, by Lemma
3, ∂ν(E) is nonempty whenever ∂g (P (E)) is nonempty.
Proposition 9 Let ν = g (P):Σ → R be a measure game. Then ∂ν(E) 6=
∅ for all E ∈ Σ if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) g : R(P) → R c a nb ee x t e n d e da sac o n c a v ef u n c t i o no ns o m eo p e n
convex set U containing R(P).
(ii) ν is superadditive and g : R(P) → R is such that g (αP (E)) =
αg (P (E)) for each α ∈ (0,1) and each E ∈ Σ.
Condition (i) is the familiar suﬃcient condition from Convex Analysis,
while condition (ii) is important in cooperative game theory, where the TU
games that satisfy condition (ii) are called market games. They play an
important role in the study of exchange economies (see Hart and Neyman,
1988).
94 Cores and Derivatives
The derivative for games introduced in De￿nition 1 was used by Epstein
and Marinacci (2000) to study the cores of some TU games. In particular,
they study a class of important economic games that have singleton cores
and, loosely speaking, they show that the singleton actually consists of the
derivative of the game. Since for real-valued functions the derivative can be
viewed as a singleton superdiﬀerential, it is natural to wonder whether the
superdiﬀerentials for games that we introduced are related to the derivatives
of De￿nition 1, and, more importantly, whether they can be used to char-
acterize cores that are not necessarily singleton. In this section we address
these natural queries.
Interestingly, as in Epstein and Marinacci (2000), also in this work linear
sets play a key role. Our ￿rst result provides a subcalculus characterization
of the core based on linear sets.
Theorem 10 Consider the following conditions:
(i) E ∈ A.
(ii) core(ν)=∂ν(E) ∩ ∂ν(Ec).
(iii) ∂ν(E) ∩ ∂ν(Ec) 6= ∅.
We have that (i) implies (ii), while the three conditions are equivalent
whenever core(ν) 6= ∅.
In other words, core(ν)=∂ν(E) ∩ ∂ν(Ec) when E is linear, regardless
of whether or not core(ν) is nonempty. However, if core(ν) is nonempty,
the three conditions are equivalent.
Proof. We ￿rst prove that (i) implies (ii). Let E ∈ A.I t i s e a s y t o s e e
that core(ν) ⊆ ∂ν(E)∩∂ν(Ec). In fact, for each m ∈ core(ν) it holds that
m ≥ ν, m(E)=ν (E),a n dm(Ec)=ν (Ec). We now prove the converse
inclusion, that is, ∂ν(E) ∩ ∂ν(Ec) ⊆ core(ν).L e t m ∈ ∂ν(E) ∩ ∂ν(Ec).
Since
0=ν (∅) ≤ ν (E) − m(E),
we have m(E) ≤ ν (E).M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e
ν (Ω)=ν (E ∪ E
c) ≤ ν (E)+m(E
c),
10we have m(Ec) ≥ ν (Ec). By taking Ec in place of E, a similar argu-
ment shows that m(E) ≥ ν (E) and m(Ec) ≤ ν (Ec), and we conclude that
m(E)=ν (E) and m(Ec)=ν (Ec).F i n a l l y ,e a c hs e tB ∈ Σ can be written
as B = E ∪ F − G,w i t hF ∩ E = ∅ and G ⊆ E.H e n c e ,
ν (B)=ν (E ∪ F − G) ≤ ν (E)+m(F) − m(G)
= m(E)+m(F) − m(G)=m(B),
and so m ∈ core(ν).
Next we prove that (iii) implies (i) when core(ν) 6= ∅.L e tm ∈ ∂ν(E)∩
∂ν(Ec). As we have just seen, this implies that m(Ec) ≤ ν (Ec) and that
ν (Ω) ≤ ν (E)+m(Ec).S i n c ecore(ν) 6= ∅,w eh a v eν (E)+ν (Ec) ≤ ν (Ω).
Hence,
ν (Ω) ≤ ν (E)+m(E
c) ≤ ν (E)+ν (E
c) ≤ ν (Ω),
and we conclude that E ∈ A. To complete the proof, observe that (ii)
obviously implies (iii) when core(ν) 6= ∅.
Having established a subcalculus characterization of the core, we now
move to study the relations of supergradients with the derivatives of games.
Theorem 11 Let ν : Σ → R be a game superdiﬀerentiable and diﬀerentiable
at E.T h e n
δν(•;E) ∈ ∂ν(E)+KE.
If, in addition, E is linear and core(ν) 6= ∅,t h e n
δν(•;E) ∈ ∂ν(E
c).
Proof. Suppose that E is a maximum set for ν,t h a ti s ,ν (E) ≥ ν (A) for























































= δν(F;E) − δν(G;E),
11and so δν(G;E) ≥ δν (F;E) for each F ⊆ Ec and G ⊆ E.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
δν(G;E) ≥ δν(∅;E) ≥ δν(F;E), and we conclude that δν(•;E) ∈ KE.L e t
m ∈ ∂ν(E).B y d e ￿nition, ν − m is a game with maximum at E.H e n c e ,
by what we just proved, δ(ν − m)(•;E) ∈ KE, which implies δν(•;E) ∈
m(•)+KE,a n ds oδν(•;E) ∈ ∂ν(E)+KE.
Suppose that E ∈ A and that core(ν) 6= ∅.L e tm ∈ core(ν). The game
ν − m is a game with maximum at E.H e n c e ,δ (ν − m)(•;E) ∈ KE,w h i c h ,
by Theorem 10 and Proposition 4, implies






In the last theorem we saw that δν(•;E) ∈ ∂ν(Ec) when E is linear and
core(ν) 6= ∅. This raises the question of when δν(•;E) ∈ ∂ν(E),s o m e t h i n g
that in standard subcalculus happens in many important cases.
Theorem 12 Let ν : Σ → R be a game diﬀerentiable at a linear set A.I f
core(ν) 6= ∅,t h e n∂ν(A) 6= ∅ and the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) δν(•;A) ∈ ∂ν(A).
(ii) core(ν)={δν(•;A)}.
(iii) δν(•;A) ∈ core(ν).
(iv) δν(A;A)=ν (A) and δν(Ac;A)=ν (Ac).
Moreover, if (i) and (iv) hold for some linear set A,t h e ncore(ν) is
nonempty and coincides with the singleton {δν(•;A)}.
Proof. Since A is linear, by Theorem 10 core(ν) ⊆ ∂ν(A) and so core(ν) 6=
∅ implies ∂ν(A) 6= ∅. Having established that ν is superdiﬀerentiable at
A, we can prove that (i) implies (iv). Let m ∈ core(ν). By Theorem 10,
m ∈ ∂ν(Ac),a n ds oν (A) ≤ ν (Ac)+m(A) − m(Ac).M o r e o v e r ,δν(•;A) ∈
∂ν(A) implies ν (Ac) ≤ ν (A)+δν(Ac;A) − δν(A;A). Adding up, we get
δν(A;A)−m(A) ≤ δν(Ac;A)−m(Ac). On the other hand, since ν−m has
12a maximum at A, by what we proved in the proof of Theorem 11 we have
δ(ν − m)(•;A) ∈ KA,a n ds o
δν(A;A) − m(A) ≥ 0 ≥ δν(A
c;A) − m(A
c).
A l lt h i si m p l i e st h a tδν(A;A)−m(A)=δν(Ac;A)−m(Ac)=0 .S i n c eA ∈
A and m ∈ core(ν), we conclude that δν(A;A)=ν (A) and δν(Ac;A)=
ν (Ac).
We now show that (iv) implies (ii). Let m ∈ core(ν).S i n c eδ (ν − m)(•;A) ∈
KA,t h e nf o re a c hG ⊆ A it holds that δν(G;A) ≥ m(G).A l o n g w i t h
δν(A;A)=ν (A)=m(A), this implies that m(G)=δν(G;A) for each
G ⊆ A. A similar argument shows that m(F)=δν(F;A) for each F ⊆ Ac,
and so m = δν(•;A), which proves that core(ν)={δν(•;A)}.
Since (ii) trivially implies (iii), it remains to prove that (iii) implies (i).
Since core(ν) 6= ∅ and A ∈ A, by Theorem 10 δν(•;A) ∈ core(ν)=∂ν(A)∩
∂ν(Ac) ⊆ ∂ν(A).
Suppose that (i) and (iv) hold for some A ∈ A. By (iv), ν (Ω)=δν(Ω;A)
and together (i) and (iv) imply that, for all E ∈ Σ,
ν (E) ≤ δν(E;A)+ν (A) − δν(A;A)=δν(E;A).
Hence, δν(•;A) ∈ core(ν) and so, by what we proved above, core(ν)=
{δν(•;A)}.
Example. Let ν = g(P):Σ → R be a measure game and suppose there is
a linear set A such that g is diﬀerentiable and superdiﬀerentiable at P (A) ∈
ri(R(P)). By Theorem 12, core(ν) ⊆ {∇g (P (A)) • P (•)}.I n f a c t , s i n c e
P (A) ∈ ri(R(P)), by a well-known result of Convex Analysis for each χ ∈
∂g (P (A)) we have [∇g (P (A)) − χ]•w =0for all w ∈ span(R(P)).H e n c e ,
∇g (P (A)) • P (•)=χ • P (•) and so, by Lemma 3, ∇g(P (A)) • P (•) ∈
∂g (P (A)). Since in Epstein and Marinacci (2000) it is shown that δν(•;A)=
∇g (P (A)) • P (•), we conclude that δν(•;A) ∈ ∂ν(A) and so, by Theorem
12, core(ν) ⊆ {∇g (P (A)) • P (•)}.
Example. Consider the production game ν = g (P):Σ → R de￿ned via




N ,w h e r ee a c hαi ≥ 0
and
PN
i=1 αi = 1.I fP (Ω) ∈ RN
++, then, by Theorem 12,








13For, given any P (Ω) ∈ RN
++, the concave function g is diﬀerentiable and
superdiﬀerentiable at all points of ri(R(P)). In particular, it is easy to
check that all sets At such that P (At)=tP (Ω) for some t ∈ (0,1) are
linear and belong to ri(R(P)). Hence, by the argument of the previous
example, δν(•;At) ∈ ∂ν(At). Moreover, some simple algebra shows that
δν(At;At)=ν (At) and δν(Ac
t;At)=ν (Ac
t). Hence, conditions (i) and (iv)
of Theorem 12 are therefore satis￿ed and so, by Theorem 12, Eq. (3) holds.
5M e a s u r e G a m e s
Games relevant for economic applications have often the form of a measure
game g (P):Σ → R. In this section we study in more detail the structure of
the superdiﬀe r e n t i a l sa n dc o r e so ft h i sc l a s so fg a m e s .
The natural question for cores of measure games is how to relate the
underlying vector charge P with the charges in the cores. We start by es-
tablishing a general result of this type for the important countably additive
case. To this end, we introduce lower Lipschitz functions.
De￿nition 13 Af u n c t i o ng : A ⊆ RN → R is (locally) lower Lipschitzian
at x0 ∈ A if there is a neighborhood B = B (x0,ε) of x0 and a constant γ > 0
such that, for all x ∈ B ∩ A,
[g (x) − g (x0)]
− ≤ γ kx − x0k.
We denote by P ∗ the ￿average￿ measure (1/N)
PN
i=1 Pi and in the next
statement k•k∞ is the norm of the space L∞ (Ω,Σ,P∗). In reading the result
keep in mind that a function is lower semicontinuous at some point when it
is there lower Lipschitzian.
Theorem 14 Let g (P):Σ → R be a measure game and suppose that P is
countably additive and that there is a linear set A (e.g., A = ∅) such that g
is lower semicontinuous at P (A) and P (Ac).T h e n ,f o re a c hm ∈ core(ν)
there exists a Σ-measurable vector function f =( f1,...,fN):Ω → RN such
















If, in addition, g is lower Lipschitzian at 0 and P (Ω), then there exists γ > 0
such that kdm/dP∗k∞ ≤ γ for all m ∈ core(ν).
Notice that Eq. (4) provides two important pieces of information on the
charges belonging to core(ν): (i) they are all countably additive; (ii) they
are all absolutely continuous w.r.t. P∗.
An especially interesting case in Theorem 14 is when to a given m in
core(ν) corresponds a constant vector function f : Ω → RN,t h a ti s ,w h e n
there exists a vector (α1,...,αN) ∈ RN such that f (ω)=( α1,...,αN) for all
ω ∈ Ω.I nt h i sc a s e ,mis a linear combination of the underlying vector charge
P, a most convenient situation.
Because of their interest, we ￿rst give a name to the subset of core(ν)
consisting of such linear combinations.
De￿nition 15 T h el i n e a rc o r eo fam e a s u r eg a m eν : g (P):Σ → R is the
subset Lcore(ν) of core(ν) de￿ned by
Lcore(ν)=core(ν) ∩ span{P1,...,PN}.
Using Lemma 3 and Theorem 10, it is easy to characterize the linear core
and to provide bounds for its dimension. All this makes use of linear sets,
thus showing their importance for Lcore(ν).
Proposition 16 Given a measure game ν = g (P):Σ → R, it holds that
Lcore(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)) ∩ ∂g (P (A
c))} (6)
for each linear set A. Moreover,
dim(Lcore(ν)) ≤ dim(R(P)) − dim(span{P (A):A ∈ A}) ≤ N − 1. (7)
Remark. This result holds for any vector charge P, not necessarily strongly
continuous. In this more general setting R(P) may not be convex and,
therefore, dim(R(P)) has to be replaced with dim(span(R(P))).
15Example. By Eq. (7), if ν = g (P):Σ → R is a scalar measure game,
then Lcore(ν), when nonempty, is a singleton with χ = g (P (Ω))/P (Ω).I n
particular, suppose that g is positive and continuous at P (Ω) and that P is
countably additive. Then, it can be checked that each m ∈ core(ν) is count-
ably additive and non-atomic. A simple application of the Lyapunov Theo-
rem shows that core(ν) 6= ∅ if and only if (g (P (Ω))/P (Ω))x ≥ g (x) for all
x ∈ [0,P(Ω)].F o r ,l e tm ∈ core(ν) and consider the vector measure (m,P).
By the Lyapunov Theorem, given any x ∈ [0,P(Ω)] there is E such that
(P (E),m(E)) = (x,(g (P (Ω))/P (Ω))x).H e n c e , (g (P (Ω))/P (Ω))x =
m(E) ≥ g (P (E)) = g (x). All this implies that in this case Lcore(ν) 6= ∅
if and only if core(ν) 6= ∅.
6L i n e a r G a m e s
In the last section we introduced the linear core, the subset of the core of
a measure game g (P):Σ → R that consists of linear combinations of the
underlying vector charge P. This part of the core is especially interesting
because of its simple form and analytical tractability, and the games whose
core and linear core coincide stand out among games in terms of simplicity
and tractability. This section is devoted to the study of these games, that
we call linear.
De￿nition 17 Am e a s u r eg a m eν = g (P):Σ → R is called linear if
core(ν)=Lcore(ν),t h a ti s ,i fcore(ν) ⊆ span{P1,...,PN}.
To provide a characterization of linear games we ￿rst state a linearity
theorem for vector measures that should be of independent interest. The
following important class of sets will play a key role.
De￿nition 18 As e tA ∈ Σ is radial if there is a set E ∈ Σ such that, for
some t ∈ (0,1),
P (A)=tP (E)+( 1 − t)P (E
c).
By the Lyapunov Theorem, radial sets form a signi￿cant subset of R(P)
and they include the sets called diagonal by Epstein and Marinacci (2000),
that is, the sets A ∈ Σ such that P (A)=tP (Ω) for some t ∈ (0,1). The next
result provides a useful characterization of radial sets in terms of the relative
interior of R(P). It is based on the important property of the range R(P) of
16having the point 2−1P (Ω) as a center of symmetry, that is, 2(2 −1P (Ω))−x ∈
R(P) for all x ∈ R(P).3 This ￿pivotal￿ feature of 2−1P (Ω) is key in the
next result.
Proposition 19 Let Σ be a σ-algebra of subsets, and P =( P1,...,PN):Σ →
RN a vector charge with each Pi strongly continuous. Then, a set E ∈ Σ is
radial if and only if P (E) belongs to the relative interior of R(P).
We can now state and prove the announced linearity theorem.
Theorem 20 Let Σ be a σ-algebra of subsets, P =( P1,...,PN):Σ → RN
+
a positive vector charge with each Pi strongly continuous and suppose m :
Σ → R is either a signed measure in ca(Ω) or a strongly continuous charge
in ba(Ω). If there exists a radial set A such that, for all E ∈ Σ,
P (E)=P (A)= ⇒ m(E)=m(A), (8)
then
m ∈ span{P1,...,Pn}. (9)
If, in addition, it holds that
P (E) ≥ P (A)= ⇒ m(E) ≥ m(A), (10)
then
m ∈ cone{P1,...,Pn}.
Finally, the coeﬃcients for which (9) holds are unique if and only if R(P)
is full dimensional.
It is important to note the two key features of this result: (i) the existence
of just a single radial set A is required; (ii) no assumption, besides either
countable additivity or strong continuity, is made on m. Theorem 20 is
the N-dimensional generalization of a uniqueness result of Marinacci (1998)
which holds for positive scalar measures P and m. In fact, in the scalar case
as e tA is radial if and only if 0 <P(A) <P(Ω). Therefore, if there exists
as e tA ∈ Σ with 0 <P(A) <P(Ω) a n ds u c ht h a t
P(E)=P(A)= ⇒ m(E)=m(A)
3See, e.g., Bolker (1969), who studies in detail the geometry of R(P).
17whenever E ∈ Σ,t h e nm(E)=
m(Ω)
P(Ω)P (E) by Theorem 20. When m is
positive, this is the uniqueness result of Marinacci (1998). In that paper,
however, uniqueness is also proved for lambda systems, while here we only
consider σ-algebras.
Though in this paper we focus on TU games, Theorem 20 can be also
interpreted in a social choice context if we assume that m and each Pi are
probability measures representing beliefs. For instance, consider diagonal
sets, that in this setting can be viewed as events over which agents have
unanimous beliefs, say Pi (A)=α ∈ (0,1) for each i = 1,...,N.B y T h e o -
rem 20, linear aggregation occurs whenever the aggregator m preserves the
agents￿ unanimous beliefs on some event A, a condition much weaker than
the Paretian conditions used in Bayesian aggregation results (cf. Fishburn,
1984 and Mongin, 1995).
Two ￿nal remarks:
(i) Two-dimensional vector probabilities (P1,P 2):Σ → [0,1] have full
dimensional range provided that just P1 6= P2.I n t h e N-dimensional case,
(P1,...,PN):Σ → RN
+ has full range when, for example, the measures Pi are
mutually singular.
(ii) Theorem 20 holds even when m is a vector measure m : Σ → RM.I n
this case, there exists a M ￿ N matrix of coeﬃcients A such that m = AP.
6.1 Characterizing Linear Games
Using Theorem 10 and the just established Theorem 20, we can now provide
a simple condition under which a measure game is linear.
Theorem 21 Let ν = g (P):Σ → R be a measure game and suppose one
of the following holds:
(i) P is countably additive and there is a linear set A∗ (e.g., A∗ = ∅)s u c h
that g is lower semicontinuous at P (A∗) and P (Ac
∗).
(ii) g is lower Lipschitzian at 0 and P (Ω).
Then, if there exists a linear and radial set, the game ν is linear and
core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)) ∩ ∂g (P (A
c))} (11)
for each linear sets A ∈ Σ. The vectors χ are univocally determined if and
only if R(P) is full dimensional, while if g is monotone on R(P),t h e nχ
18can be assumed to be non-negative, i.e., χi ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N. Finally, if
ν is exact the converse holds, that is, a linear and exact measure game has
linear and radial sets.
Remarks. (i) In Eq. (11) it may well happen that
core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)) ∩ ∂g(P (A
c))} = ∅.




P (E) if P (E) < 1
2
P (E)
2 if P (E) ≥ 1
2
(12)
with P (Ω)=1.I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a tcore(ν)={P}. However, there are
no radial sets that are linear, i.e., there are no sets A such that P (A) ∈ (0,1)
and ν (A)+ν (Ac)=1.
Proof. Let Abe linear and radial. By Theorem 10, core(ν)=∂ν(A) ∩
∂ν(Ac). Suppose core(ν) 6= ∅.F o ra l lm ∈ core(ν) and for all E ∈ Σ we
have:
g (P (E)) ≤ g (P (A)) + m(E) − m(A),
g (P (E




Hence, P (E)=P (A) implies m(E)=m(A), and so Eq. (8) of Theorem
20 holds. On the other hand, if (i) holds, then, by Lemma 35, all charges in
core(ν) are countably additive, while if (ii) holds, then, by Lemma 34, all
such charges are strongly continuous. In both cases we can apply Theorem
20, and we conclude that m ∈ span{P1,...,PN}. The game is linear and, by
Proposition 16, χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)) ∩ ∂g (P (Ac)).
Now, let A be any linear set. By Proposition 16,
core(ν)=Lcore(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)) ∩ ∂g (P (A
c))},
which proves Eq. (11).
If g is monotone, then for all m ∈ core(ν) and for all E ∈ Σ we have:
m(E) − m(A) ≥ g (P (E)) − g (P (A)) ≥ 0
19whenever P (E) ≥ P (A). Hence, Eq. (10) of Theorem 20 holds and, there-
fore, the vector χ can be chosen to be non-negative.
The only nontrivial part it remains to prove is that exact linear games
have radial and linear sets. Given t ∈ (0,1),l e tA be the diagonal set such
that P (A)=tP (Ω).G i v e n m ∈ core(ν), for a suitable χ ∈ RN we have
m(A)=χ • P (A)=tχ • P (Ω)=tν (Ω). Hence, m(A)=tν (Ω) for all
m ∈ core(ν) and so, by exactness, ν (A)=tν (Ω). A similar argument
shows that ν (Ac)=( 1 − t)ν (Ω), and we conclude that A is linear.
Finally, when core(ν)=∅,b yL e m m a3a n dT h e o r e m1 0w eh a v e
{χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)) ∩ ∂g (P (A
c))} ⊆ core(ν)
for each linear set A ∈ Σ.
Conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 21 are both very mild requirements.
In particular, condition (i) is more demanding on P,w h i c hi sr e q u i r e dt ob e
countable additivity rather than just ￿nite additive, but less on g,w h i c hi s
only required to be lower semicontinuous rather than lower Lipschitzian.
As to the existence of linear and radial sets, measure games g (P) that
are relevant for economic applications typically feature some homogeneity
conditions of the function g : R(P) → R, and these conditions guarantee the
existence of many linear and radial sets for the measure game g (P).
For instance, say that the measure game ν = g (P):Σ → R is radially
concave at E if, for all t ∈ (0,1),
g (tP (E)+( 1 − t)P (E
c)) ≥ tg (P (E)) + (1 − t)g(P (E
c)). (13)
Obviously, ν is radially concave at E if and only if it is radially concave at
Ec,a n dν is radially concave at all sets E in Σ when g is concave.
De￿nition 22 Am e a s u r eg a m eν = g (P):Σ → R is called radially concave
if there is some linear set A such that ν is radially concave at A.
For example, since Ω is a linear set, ν is radially concave if, for all t ∈
(0,1),
g (tP (Ω)) ≥ tg(P (Ω)),
a very mild homogeneity requirement. Another simple case in which ν is
radially concave is when the set A such that P (A)=2 −1P (Ω) is linear. In
this case Eq. (13) is trivially satis￿ed.
20Radial concavity is a weak condition satis￿ed by many economic TU
games. For example, the measure games whose functions g : R(P) → R are
concave or homogeneous of degree one are radially concave, as well as the
measure games that have a function g : R(P) → R homogeneous of degree
k<1,p r o v i d e dg (P (Ω)) ≥ 0. In particular, market games are radially
concave, as their function g is homogeneous of degree one.
Radially concave games that have nonempty cores admit many radial and
linear sets, and, consequently, by Theorem 21, they are linear, as stated in
the next Corollary.
Corollary 23 Let ν = g (P):Σ → R be a radially concave measure game
and suppose one of conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 21 holds. Then, the
game ν is linear and, for each linear set A,










Remark. Interestingly, here core(ν) is determined by the superdiﬀerential
of g at 2−1P (Ω), the center of symmetry of R(P).
Example. Let g : RN
+ → R be a concave and positive homogeneous func-
tion and assume P (Ω) ∈ RN
++. Consider the following two broad classes of
functions:
g1 (x)=g (x)+h1 (x),
g2 (x)=g (x)h2 (x),
for all x ∈ RN
+.I fh1 (tP (Ω)) = 0 and h2 (tP (Ω)) = 1 for all t ≥ 0, then the
games g1 (P) and g2 (P) are radially concave. In view of Corollary 23, it is
easy to provide conditions under which the cores of these measure games are
nonempty. For instance, for the ￿rst class it suﬃces that ∂h1 (2−1P (Ω)) 6= ∅,
while for the other class it is enough to require that h2 (x) ∈ [0,1] for all
x ∈ RN
+.
In Theorem 21 and in Corollary 23 we only assumed that the real-valued
function g was de￿ned on the range R(P). In applications, however, it is
often the case that the function g de￿ning the measure game is de￿ned on
an open convex subset G containing R(P), for example RN itself. In this
case, we have two superdiﬀerentials, the one of g restricted to R(P), i.e.
21∂g|R(P) (x), and the one that g has relative to the open convex subset G, i.e.
∂g (x). Naturally, ∂g|R(P) (x) is the superdiﬀerential relevant for Theorem 21
and Corollary 23. On the other hand, the superdiﬀerential ∂g (x) may be
easier to compute, especially when g is de￿ned on RN.
The next result can therefore be useful, as it shows that it is possible to
use directly ∂g (P (A)) when g is concave and A radial.
Proposition 24 Let P =( P1,...,PN):Σ → R be a strongly continuous
vector charge and let g : G → R be a concave function, where G is an open
convex set containing R(P).F o rt h em e a s u r eg a m eν = g (P):Σ → R,i t
holds that










for each linear and radial set A.
Example (Generalized Linear Production Games). Let a : T → RN be a
continuous map, where T is a compact metric space, and de￿ne a function
g : RN → R by g(x)=m i n t∈T a(t) • x for all x ∈ RN. Consider the measure
game ν = g (P),w h i c hw ec a l lageneralized linear production game.W h e n
T is a ￿nite set and a(t) ≡ at ∈ RN
+, we have the linear production games of
Owen (1975) and Billera and Raanan (1981). Since the function g is concave
on RN, by a standard result in Convex Analysis (see, e.g., Hiriart-Urruty and
Lemarechal, 1993), we have
∂g (x)=co(a(t):t ∈ I (x)),
where I (x)={t : a(t) • x = g (x)}. Consider a diagonal set A with P (A)=
αP (Ω) for some α ∈ (0,1). Simple algebra shows that
I (P (A)) = I (P (Ω)) = {t : a(t) • P (Ω)=g(P (Ω))}.
Since each diagonal set is linear, by Proposition 24,
core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ co(a(t):a(t) • P (Ω)=ν (Ω))}.
This includes Corollary 2.7 of Billera and Raanan (1981), which therefore
follows from Proposition 24 using some standard Convex Analysis.
226.2 Diﬀerentiability
Proposition 16 characterized the linear core of a measure game ν = g (P):
Σ → R through the superdiﬀerentials of the function g : R(P) → R and
Theorem 21 provided a simple condition under which the entire core can be
characterized in this way. In view of standard subcalculus and of Theorem 12,
it is natural to wonder what happens when some diﬀerentiability is assumed
on g, in particular, whether the core shrinks to a singleton.
Proposition 25 Let ν = g (P):Σ → R be a measure game and suppose
one of conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 21 holds. If there is a linear and
radial set A such that g is diﬀerentiable at P (A),t h e n
core(ν)=∅ or core(ν)={∇g (P (A)) • P (•)}.
If, in addition, g is diﬀerentiable and superdiﬀerentiable at both P (A) and
P (Ac),t h e ncore(ν) 6= ∅ if and only if ∇g (P (A)) = ∇g (P (Ac)).
Diﬀerentiability has therefore a remarkably strong impact on the core:
even just assuming that g is diﬀerentiable at P (A) f o r c e st h ec o r et ob ea t
most a singleton.
Example. Let ν = g (P):Σ → R be a market game, that is, ν is
superadditive and g is homogeneous of degree one. If g is diﬀerentiable
at P (Ω),t h e ncore(ν)={∇g (P (Ω)) • P (•)}. In fact, by Proposition 9,
∂g (P (E)) 6= ∅ for all E ∈ Σ. Moreover, all diagonal sets are linear and g
is diﬀerentiable at all them because it is diﬀerentiable at P (Ω).I n p a r t i c -
ular, ∇g (P (A)) = ∇g (P (Ω)) for all diagonal sets. Hence, by Proposition
25, core(ν)={∇g (P (Ω)) • P (•)} = {∇g (P (Ω)) • P (•)}. This result is es-
sentially due to Aumann and Shapley (1974) and plays a key role in their
analysis of exchange economies. It therefore follows from Proposition 25.
Example. Let ν = g (P):Σ → R be a measure game de￿ned as follows:







2 if (P1 (E),P 2 (E)) 6=( 1,1)
0 if P1 (E)=P2 (E)=1
All diagonal sets of this game are linear and g is diﬀerentiable at all them.
Hence, by Proposition 25, core(ν) ⊆ {2P1 − P2}. In fact, some algebra shows
that core(ν)={2P1 − P2}.
23Unlike Proposition 25, the next result does not require A to be radial, at
the cost of a stronger assumption on the function g.
Corollary 26 Let ν = g (P):Σ → R b eam e a s u r eg a m ea n ds u p p o s eo n e
of conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 21 holds. If there is a linear set A such
that ν is radially concave at A and g is diﬀerentiable on some neighborhood
U of P (A),t h e n
core(ν)=∅ or core(ν)={∇g (P (A)) • P (•)}.
Remark. If g : R(P) → R is concave and diﬀerentiable at P (A),t h e nt h e
corollary holds.4
Proof. Since ν is radially concave at A, it is easy to check that all sets
Aα such that P (Aα)=αP (A)+( 1 − α)P (Ac) are linear (see the proof of
Corollary 23). For α small enough, P (Aα) ∈ U and so g is diﬀerentiable
at P (Aα).S i n c e Aα is a radial set, a simple application of Proposition 25
proves the result.
7 Finite-Dimensional Cores
Let sc(Ω) be the vector subspace spanned by the strongly continuous charges
of ba(Ω). The key feature of linear measure games is that their cores are
￿nite-dimensional subsets of sc(Ω). As in exact games there is a tight con-
n e c t i o nb e t w e e nt h ec o r ea n dt h eg a m e ,o n em a yw o n d e rw h e t h e rt h e r ee x i s t s
a characterization of general exact games featuring ￿nite-dimensional cores
in sc(Ω).
In this section we provide such a characterization: Theorem 31 shows
that an exact game has a ￿nite-dimensional core in sc(Ω) if and only if it
is a generalized linear production game. This is a class of measure games
introduced in the previous section and whose associated function g has the
very simple form g (x)=m i n t∈T a(t) • x,w h e r eT is a compact metric space
and a : T → RN is a continuous map.
The characterization is therefore sharp: exact generalized linear produc-
tion games are the only exact games having ￿nite-dimensional cores in sc(Ω).
As Hart and Neyman (1988) observe on p. 32, most relevant economic TU
4Recall that g can be diﬀerentiable at P (A) only if g is de￿ned (or can be extended)
on a suitable open subset of P (A).
24games are linear. In view of Theorem 31, we can say that all such games,
when exact, have to be generalized linear production games.
To prove this characterization we have to introduce some notions, that
may be of independent interest. We denote by Γα a( p o s s i b l y￿nite) w∗-
compact subset of ba(Ω) such that m(Ω)=α for each m ∈ Γα.
De￿nition 27 The closure under majorization (m-closure, for short) e Γα of
as e tΓα is de￿ned as follows: m ∈ e Γα if m(Ω)=α and if for each E ∈ Σ
there is m0 ∈ Γα such that m(E) ≥ m0 (E).
We say that a set Γα is m-closed if e Γα = Γα. The next lemma contains a
few properties of the m-closure.
Lemma 28 For each set Γα we have:





(ii) e Γα is w∗-compact and convex.
(iii) The game





is the unique exact game such that core(ν)=e Γα.
An interesting consequence of Lemma 28 is that a w∗-compact and convex
set is the core of a game if and only if it is m-closed. In fact, cores are
clearly m-closed. On the other hand, by point (iii) of Lemma 28, a w∗-
compact, convex, and m-closed set e Γα is the core of the game minm∈e Γα m(•).
Another noteworthy consequence of point (iii) is the existence of a one-to-one
correspondence between exact games and the sets e Γα.
Let π : RN → span(R(P)) be the orthogonal projection on span(R(P)).
De￿ne the map R : span{P1,...,P N} → span(R(P)) between our two key
vector spaces as follows: R(χ • P)=π (χ) for all χ ∈ RN. This means that,
for all m ∈ span{P1,...,PN},w eh a v em = R(m) • P.
By the next result, R is a ￿canonical￿ isomorphism between the two
spaces.
Lemma 29 The map R : span{P1,...,PN} → span(R(P)) is a linear and
w∗-continuous isomorphism.
25Using the canonical isomorphism R, we get the following important prop-
erty of the m-closure.
Lemma 30 Let P =( P1,...,PN):Σ → R be a strongly continuous vector
charge. Then Γα ⊆ span{P1,...,PN} implies e Γα = co(Γα).
The next example shows that Lemma 30 may fail if P is not strongly
continuous.
Example. Let Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3} and Σ =2 Ω. Consider the compact and
convex set of probability charges
Γ1 =
(
m : Σ → [0,1]:
3 X
i=1
m(ωi)=1 and m(ω1) ≤ m(ω2)
)
.
It is easy to check that the charge m∗ =( 1/2,0,1/2) belongs to e Γ1, but it
does not belong to co(Γ1). In particular, this implies that Γ1 cannot be the
core of any game.
We can now state and prove the announced characterization, which shows
that an exact game has a ￿nite-dimensional core in sc(Ω) i fa n do n l yi fi ti s
a generalized linear production game.
Theorem 31 Let P =( P1,...,PN):Σ → RN
+ be a strongly continuous vector
charge. Given a game ν : Σ → R, consider the following conditions:
(i) ν is exact and core(ν) ⊆ span{P1,...,PN},
(ii) ν is an exact and generalized linear production game,
(iii) there is a w∗-compact set Γα ⊆ span{P1,...,PN} such that ν (E)=
minm∈Γα m(E) for all E,
(iv) there is a function g : RN → R concave and homogeneous of degree one
such that ν (E)=g (P (E)) for all E.
Then, (i) ⇔ (ii) ⇔ (iii) ⇒ (iv),w i t h
g (x)= m i n
{χ:χ∈R(Γα)}
χ • x
26for all x ∈ RN,a n d
core(ν)=e Γα = co(Γα)={χ • P : χ ∈ co(R(Γα))}. (14)
Finally, if (iv) holds, there is an exact game νe = ge (P),w h e r e
ge (x)= m i n
{χ∈∂g(0):χ•P(Ω)=g(P(Ω))}
χ • x
for each x ∈ RN,s u c ht h a tνe ≥ ν and core(νe)=core(ν) ⊆ span{P1,...,PN}.
Remark. Up to some obvious changes, Theorem 31, as well as Lemmas 29
and 30, still hold if P were a signed vector charge. In fact, we can replace

























this way all cores that are ￿nite dimensional subsets of sc(Ω) are indeed
covered by Theorem 31.
We close with a simple corollary of Theorem 31, which shows that exact
games without ￿interior￿ linear sets cannot have ￿nite-dimensional cores in
sc(Ω).
Corollary 32 Let ν be an exact game such that for all its linear sets A we
have either ν (A)=0or ν (A)=ν (Ω).I f ν (Ω) 6=0 ,t h e ncore(ν),w h e n
nonempty, is not a ￿nite-dimensional subset of sc(Ω).
Proof. Suppose core(ν) 6= ∅ and suppose, per contra,t h a tcore(ν) is
a ￿nite-dimensional subset of sc(Ω). By Theorem 31, there is a function
g : RN → R concave and homogeneous of degree one such that ν (E)=
g (P (E)) for all E. Hence, given any diagonal set Et,w i t hP (Et)=tP (Ω),
it holds ν (Et)=tν (Ω). Therefore, Et is linear and ν (Et) / ∈ {0,ν (Ω)},a
contradiction.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
1. Theorem 21 generalizes in several ways a well-known result of Billera and
Raanan (1981), which establishes that cores of some measure games consist
of linear combinations of measures (Corollary 2.6 p. 422).
27First, their result requires the existence of a linear set A such that both
P (A)=2 −1P (Ω) and ν (A)=2 −1ν (Ω).W e o n l y r e q u i r e A to be a linear
and radial set.
Second, they require that ν ∈ pNA0, the supnorm closure of polynomial
functions of several non-atomic measures de￿n e do nas p a c ei s o m o r p h i ct o
[0,1] with its Borel sets (Aumann and Shapley (1974) p. 152). This topo-
logical structure is crucial for their results, and g (P) ∈ pNA0 if and only
if g is continuous on R(P). In contrast, we do not make any topological
assumption, and our result holds for any measure game ν.5
Third, their Corollary 2.7 establishes the positivity of the coeﬃcients of
the linear combinations for nonatomic linear production games, a special
class of measure games whose functions g are monotone. Our Theorem 21,
instead, holds for any measure game having a monotone function g.
Finally, Theorem 21 follows from a subcalculus approach to the core and
from a general linearity result for vector measures that put this result in a
broader perspective. In particular, Proposition 25 and Corollary 26 are a
dividend of this more general approach.
2. Corollary 23 extends some recent interesting results of Einy, Moreno,
and Shitovitz (1999). Using diﬀerent techniques, they prove (Theorem C) a
special case of Corollary 23 for measure games whose function g : R(P) → R
is concave and continuous at P (Ω), rather than for general radially concave
measure games, as we can do on the basis of our generalization of Billera and
Raanan (1981).
3. Linear cores are very tractable objects. In fact, it is easy to check that
to compute the linear core of a measure game g(P) is enough to solve the









αixi ≥ g (x1,...,xN) for all (x1,...,xN) ∈ R(P).
5Theorem 21 can be stated in the form used by Billera and Raanan (1981) for their
Corollary 2.6, where ν is not necessarily a measure game. We prefer to use directly measure
games, the most interesting class of games to which this class of results applies.
28This problem is linear and involves ￿nitely many variables ￿ the coeﬃcients
(α1,...,αN) ￿ that appear in in￿nitely many constraint ￿ the inequalities PN
i=1 αixi ≥ g (x1,...,x N) with (x1,...,x N) ∈ R(P). P r o b l e m so ft h i st y p e
are called semi-in￿nite linear problems and there is a large literature dealing
with their theoretical and computational features (see, e.g., Goberna and
Lopez, 1998). Since they involve only ￿nitely many variables, computation-
ally they are in general much more tractable than standard in￿nite programs
and it is often possible to study them via their ￿nite linear subprograms.
A Appendix
A.1 Proposition 6
The proof is based on the following lemma, which generalizes to bounded
convex games a well-known properties of positive convex games.
Lemma 33 Let ν : Σ → R be a bounded and convex game. Given any chain
{Ei}i∈I,t h e r ei sm ∈ core(ν) such that m(Ei)=ν (Ei) for all i ∈ I.
Proof. Given any Σ-measurable simple function f : Ω → R,t h eC h o -
quet integral
R
fdν is still well de￿ned. Now, let f,g : Ω → R be any
two Σ-measurable simple functions. Let Σf,g be the smallest algebra that
makes f and g measurable. As Σf,g is ￿nite, there is a (possibly zero)
measure m on Σf,g such that ν (E) ≥ m(E) for all E ∈ Σf,g.H e n c e ,
ν − m is a positive convex game on Σf,g,a n ds o ,b yac l a s s i cr e s u l to f
[6],
R




gd(ν − m). In turn, this ob-
viously implies
R




gdν. We conclude that the Choquet
integral
R
fdν is a superadditive functional on the vector space B0 (Σ) of
Σ-measurable simple functions.
Let Σ∗ be a subalgebra of Σ on which there is a charge m∗ : Σ∗ → R such




.S i n c e
R
fdν is a superadditive functional on B0 (Σ),
by the Hahn-Banach Theorem there is an extension m : Σ → R of m∗ such
that m ∈ core(ν).
Consider now the chain {Ei}i∈I.L e t ΣJ be the algebra generated by a
￿nite subchain {Ei}i∈J.L e tmJ : ΣJ → R be the, possibly zero, charge on
ΣJ such that ν (E) ≥ mJ (E) for all E ∈ ΣJ. By well-known results (see,
e.g., [7]), there exists m0 ∈ core(ν − mJ) such that m0(Ei)=( ν − mJ)(Ei)




such that m∗ (Ei)=ν (Ei) for
29all i ∈ J. In turn, this implies the existence of an extension m : Σ → R of
m∗ such that m ∈ core(ν).
Let ΛJ = {m ∈ core(ν):m(Ej)=ν (Ej) for all j ∈ J}.S i n c e core(ν)
is w∗-compact, the set ΛJ is w∗-compact. Moreover, by what we just proved,
ΛJ 6= ∅. The collection {ΛJ}{J:J⊆I and |J|<∞} has the ￿nite intersection prop-
erty, and so its overall intersection is nonempty. Let m be an element of such
intersection. We have m ∈ core(ν) and m(Ei)=ν (Ei) for all i ∈ I,a s
desired.
Proof of Proposition 6. By Lemma 33, there exists m ∈ core(ν) such
that m(E1)=ν (E1) and m(E2)=ν (E2). This immediately implies that
m ∈ ∂ν(E1) ∩ ∂ν(E2),a n ds o∂ν(E1) ∩ ∂ν(E2) 6= ∅.A st o t h e c o n v e r s e ,
suppose that ∂ν(E1)∩∂ν(E2) 6= ∅ for every E1 ⊆ E2.L e tE and E0 be any
two sets of Σ.L e tm ∈ ∂ν(E ∩ E0)∩∂ν(E ∪ E0). Then, ν (E) ≤ ν (E ∪ E0)−
m(E ∪ E0)+m(E) and ν (E0) ≤ ν (E ∩ E0)−m(E ∩ E0)+m(E0).B ya d d i n g
up we get ν (E)+ν (E0) ≤ ν (E ∪ E0)+ν (E ∩ E0), as desired. Hence, ν is




1 (Σ)={f ∈ B (Σ):0≤ f ≤ 1}, which are the ideal sets in the ter-
minology of [2]. Given a bounded convex game ν, consider the functional




0 ν (f ≥ t)dt f ∈ B
+
1 (Σ)





0 ν (f ≥ t)dt is the Choquet integral of f w.r.t. ν.I t i s
easy to check that, by Lemma 33,
R +∞
0 ν (f ≥ t)dt is a well de￿ned Riemann
integral. Again by Lemma 33, it is easy to check that ν∗ is a proper concave
function on B (Σ).M o r e o v e r ,ν∗ (1E)=ν (E) for all E ∈ Σ.
Given m ∈ ba(Ω),l e tLm : B (Σ) → R be de￿ned by Lm (f)=
R
fdm.
Let ∂ν∗ (f) be the standard superdiﬀerential of ν∗ : B (Σ) → R at f.W e
show that ∂ν∗ (1E)={Lm : m ∈ ∂ν(E)} for all E ∈ Σ.C l e a r l y ,∂ν∗ (1E) ⊆
{Lm : m ∈ ∂ν(E)} for all E ∈ Σ. As to the converse inclusion, let m ∈
∂ν(E).B yd e ￿nition, ν (A) − m(A) ≤ ν (E) − m(E) for all A ∈ Σ.H e n c e ,




∗ (f) − Lm (f)=
Z 1
0




30and so Lm ∈ ∂ν∗ (1E). This proves the converse inclusion, so that ∂ν∗ (1E)=
{Lm : m ∈ ∂ν(E)} for all E ∈ Σ. With a slight abuse of notation, we write
∂ν∗ (1E)=∂ν(E).
There is f ∈ B
+
1 (Σ) in a neighborhood of which (w.r.t. the norm topol-
ogy) both ν∗
1 and ν∗
2 are bounded (e.g., f = α1Ω for some α ∈ (0,1)). Then,
by Theorem 20 of [22], for all E ∈ Σ we have:










2 (E)=∂ν1 (E)+∂ν2 (E),
as desired.
A.3 Proposition 9
Consider condition (i). Let x0 ∈ R(P).S i n c e g is concave on U,b ya
standard result in Convex Analysis (see Theorem 23.4 of [21]) there is a
vector χ ∈ RN such that g (x) ≤ g (x0)+χ • (x − x0) for all x ∈ U.H e n c e ,
χ • P ∈ ∂ν(E) if P (E)=x0.
Consider now condition (ii). Let K and W be respectively the cone
and subspace generated by the convex set R(P).S i n c e 0 ∈ R(P), W =
K − K (see Theorem 2.7 of [21]). De￿ne the function g0 : K → R by
g0 (λx)=λg (x) with x ∈ R(P) and λ > 0. The function g0 is well-de￿ned
and it is superadditive and homogeneous of degree one on K.D e ￿ne g00 :
W → R by g00 (w)=s u p {g0 (x)+g0 (y):x,y ∈ K and x − y = w}.T h e
function g00 as well is superadditive and homogeneous of degree one on W.
Given any x0 ∈ R(P),l e tW0 be the subspace of W generated by x0, i.e.,
W0 = {αx0 : α ∈ R}.D e ￿ne the linear functional L0 : W0 → R by L0 (αx0)=
αg (x0) for all α ∈ R.I fα ≥ 0, clearly L0 (αx0)=g00 (αx0) for all w ∈ W0.
If α < 0,w eh a v e :
L(αx0)=αg (x0)=( −α)(−g (x0)) ≥ (−α)g
00 (−x0)=g
00 (αx0).
By the Hahn-Banach Theorem, there exists a linear functional L : W → R
that extends L0 on W a n ds u c ht h a tL(w) ≥ g00 (w) for all w ∈ W.S i n c e
W is a subspace of RN, there exists a linear functional L∗ : RN → R that
extends L on RN.L e t χ∗ ∈ RN such that L∗ (x)=χ∗ • x for all x ∈ RN.
Then, χ∗ • w ≥ g00 (w) for all w ∈ W and χ∗ • x0 = g (x0).H e n c e ,g i v e na n y
x ∈ R(P),w eh a v eg (x)−g (x0) ≤ χ∗•x−χ∗•x0, which implies χ∗ ∈ ∂g (x0).
We conclude that ∂g (x0) 6= ∅, as desired.
31A.4 Theorem 14
Lemma 34 Let g (P):Σ → R be a measure game with P countably addi-
tive. If g is lower Lipschitzian at 0 and P (Ω),t h e r ee x i s t sγ > 0 such that
kmk(E) ≤ γP ∗ (E) for all E ∈ Σ and all m ∈ core(ν). In particular, all
charges in core(ν) are countably additive.
Remark. To prove that kmk(•) ≤ γP∗ (•) it suﬃces that P is ￿nitely addi-
tive. In turn, this implies that m is strongly continuous.
Proof. Let m ∈ core(ν). By Theorem 10, m ∈ ∂ν(Ω) and m ∈ ∂ν(∅).
Since m ∈ ∂ν(Ω),
g (P (E)) − g (P (Ω)) ≤− m(E
c) (15)
for all E ∈ Σ.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eg is lower Lipschitzian at P (Ω), there exists
γ > 0 and ε1 > 0 such that
[g (P (E)) − g(P (Ω))]
− ≤ γ1 kP (E) − P (Ω)k (16)
for all E ∈ Σ such that kP (E) − P (Ω)k ≤ ε1. Hence, Eqs. (15) and (16)
imply that m(Ec) ≤ γ1 kP (Ec)k for all E ∈ Σ such that kP (Ec)k ≤ ε1.
Since this holds for all E ∈ Σ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tm+ (E) ≤ γ1 kP (E)k for all
E ∈ Σ such that kP (E)k ≤ ε1. On the other hand, since m ∈ ∂ν(∅),w e
have g (P (E)) ≤ m(E) for all E ∈ Σ, and, being g lower Lipschitzian at 0,
there exists γ2 > 0 and ε2 > 0 such that [g (P (E))]
− ≤ γ2 kP (E)k for all
E ∈ Σ such that kP (E)k ≤ ε2. Hence, m− (E) ≤ γ2 kP (E)k for all E ∈ Σ
such that kP (E)k ≤ ε2. Setting γ = γ1 ∨ γ2 and ε = ε1 ∧ ε2, all this implies
that kmk(E) ≤ 2γ kP (E)k for all E ∈ Σ such that kP (E)k ≤ ε.S i n c eP is
positive, there also exists γ > 0 such that
kmk(E) ≤ γ kP (E)k ≤ γP
∗ (E). (17)
By the strong continuity of the component measures Pi,f o re a c hE ∈ Σ
there exists a partition {Ek}
K
k=1 of E in Σ such that P∗ (Ek) ≤ ε for each











32Lemma 35 Let ν = g (P):Σ → R be a measure game and suppose P is
countably additive. If there exists a linear set A such that g is lower semi-
continuous at P (A) and P (Ac), then all charges in core(ν) are countably
additive. Moreover, if core(ν) 6= ∅,t h e ng is continuous at P (A) and
P (Ac).
Proof. If core(ν)=∅, then obviously all charges in core(ν) are countably
additive. Assume core(ν) 6= ∅.W e￿rst prove that g is continuous at P (A)
and P (Ac).L e tP (En) → P (A).S i n c ecore(ν) 6= ∅, ν (En)+ν (Ec
n) ≤ ν (Ω)
for all En ∈ Σ. Hence,
limsup
n







[g (P (En)) + g (P (E
c
n))] ≤ g (P (Ω)),
and so, being g lower semicontinuous at P (A) and P (Ac),
limsup
n





≤ g (P (Ω)) − g(P (A
c)) = g (P (A)) ≤ liminf
n
g (P (En)).
Hence, limn g (P (En)) = g (P (A)) and g is continuous at P (A). By a similar
method one can easily see that g is continuous at P (Ac) as well.
To complete the proof it suﬃces to follow an argument similar to [2] p.
173. For, let En ↑ Ω and let m ∈ core(ν).T h e n P (En ∩ A) ↑ P (A) and
P (En ∩ Ac) ↑ P (Ac),a n dw ec a nw r i t e :
liminf
n m(A ∩ En) ≥ liminf
n g(P (A ∩ En)) = g (P (A)) = g(P (Ω)) − g (P (A
c))




≥ m(Ω) − liminf
n
m(A
c ∩ En)=l i ms u p
n
m(A ∩ En),
and so limn m(A ∩ En)=m(A). On the other hand, a similar argument
shows that limn m(Ac ∩ En)=m(Ac). Hence, limnm(En)=m(Ω),w h i c h
implies that m is countably additive.
Proof of Theorem 14. In view of Lemma 35, all charges in core(ν) are
countably additive. Let us now prove that all m ∈ core(ν) are absolutely
continuous w.r.t. P ∗.F o r ,l e tE be such that P∗ (E)=0 .T h e n ,Pi (E)=0
33and Pi (Ec)=1 for each i = 1,...,N and so m(E) ≥ g (P (E)) = 0 and
m(Ec) ≥ g (P (Ec)) = ν (Ω)=m(Ω). Hence,
0 ≤ m(E)=m(Ω) − m(E
c) ≤ 0,
which implies m(E)=0 .S i n c e m ¿ P∗,b yav a r i a t i o no ft h eL e b e s g u e
Decomposition Theorem, there exist measures {mi}
N
i=1 such that mi ¿ Pi
for each i = 1,...,N,a n dm(E)=
PN
i=1 mi(E) for all E.M o r e o v e r , t h e
measures {mi}
N
i=1 are mutually singular and kmk(E)=
PN
i=1 kmki (E) for
all E (see, e.g., Proposition 8.5.1 of [3]). By the Radon-Nikodym Theorem,
there exists a Σ-measurable vector function f =( f1,...,f N):Ω → RN such








































dP ∗ = dm
dP ∗ P ∗-a.e. Conversely, assume that f : Ω → RN solves



































Finally, suppose that g is lower Lipschitzian at 0 and P (Ω).B yL e m m a
34, all charges in core(ν) are countably additive. Moreover, since m ¿ P∗,
by the Radon-Nikodym Theorem there exists a Σ-measurable function f
such that, for all sets E, m(E)=
R
E fdP∗ and kmk(E)=
R
E |f|dP ∗.S e t
A = {|f| ≥ c} with c>0.B yL e m m a3 4 ,kmk ≤ γP∗. Hence,
γP





∗ (|f| ≥ c),
which implies that γ ≥ c whenever P∗ (|f| ≥ c) > 0.T h u s ,kfk∞ ≤ γ.
34A.5 Proposition 16
By Lemma 3, χ • P ∈ ∂ν(A) if and only if χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)). On the other
hand, by Theorem 10, χ•P ∈ core(ν) if and only if χ•P ∈ ∂ν(A)∩∂ν(Ac).
Hence, χ • P ∈ core(ν) if and only if χ ∈ ∂g(P (A)) ∩ ∂g (P (Ac)).T h i s
proves (6).
We now prove (7). It is trivially true if Lcore(ν) is empty. Hence, assume
that Lcore(ν) 6= ∅.S e tdim(R(P)) = n and dim(span({P (A):A ∈ A})) =
k. Clearly, k ≤ n ≤ N.L e t{Ai}
k
i=1 ⊆ A be such that the vectors {P (A)i}
k
i=1
are linearly independent. Given m ∈ Lcore(ν),w eh a v em(•)=R(m)•P (•),
where R is the canonical isomorphism (see Lemma 29 of Section 7). Hence,
{R(m):m ∈ Lcore(ν)} ⊆ RN belongs to the aﬃne space M de￿ned by
the linear equations ξ • P (Ai)=ν (Ai) for i = 1,...,k.S i n c e R is an iso-
morphism, dim(Lcore(ν)) ≤ dim(M). The dimension of M is equal to
the dimension of the space M0 de￿ned by the homogeneous linear equations
ξ•P (Ai)=0for i = 1,...,k.A sM0 = span({P (A):A ∈ A})
⊥, we conclude
that dim(Lcore(ν)) ≤ dim(M)=n − k, as desired.
Finally, being P (Ω) 6=0 , dim(span({P (A):A ∈ A})) ≥ 1,w h i c hp r o v e s
the last inequality of (7).
A.6 Proposition 19
Since 2−1P (Ω) is the center of symmetry of R(P), it is easy to see that








+( 1 − t)R(P)
￿
. (18)




,w eh a v e















P (Ec) ∈ ri(R(P)). Next suppose that t<1/2.
















P (Ec) ∈ ri(R(P)). This completes the proof of the
result.
35A.7 Theorem 20
Assume that m ∈ ca(Ω).W e￿rst show that P (E)=0implies m(E)=0for
all E ∈ Σ. In fact, consider the sets E∩A and E∩Ac.W eh a v eP (E ∩ A)=
P (E ∩ Ac)=0 ,a n ds oP (A − E ∩ A)=P (A) and P (Ac − E ∩ Ac)=
P (Ac).B y( 8 ) ,t h i si m p l i e sm(A − E ∩ A)=m(A) and m(Ac − E ∩ Ac)=
m(Ac),s ot h a tm(E ∩ A)=m(E ∩ Ac)=0 , and we conclude that m(E)=
m(E ∩ A)+m(E ∩ Ac)=0 .
Next we show that m is non-atomic. Let m(E) 6=0 . By what has been
just proved, P (E) 6=0 .I np a r t i c u l a r ,s e tJ = {1 ≤ i ≤ N : Pi (E) > 0} and
P∗ = {Pj}j∈J. By Lyapunov Theorem there exists a partition E1,B1 of E
such that P∗ (E1)=P∗ (B1)=2 −1P∗(E).I fb o t hm(E1) 6=0and m(B1) 6=
0, we are done. Suppose, in contrast, that either m(E1)=0or m(B1)=
0. W.l.o.g., suppose that m(E1)=m(E). Again by Lyapunov Theorem,
there exists a partition E2 and B2 of E1 such that P∗ (E2)=P ∗ (B2)=
1
2P∗(E1).I f b o t h m(E2) 6=0or m(B2) 6=0 , we are done. Suppose, in
contrast, that either m(E2)=0or m(B2)=0 . W.l.o.g., assume that
m(E2)=m(E1). Proceeding in this way, either we ￿nd a set B ⊆ E such
that both m(B) 6=0and m(E − B) 6=0 , or we can construct a chain {En}n≥1
such that P ∗ (En)=2 −nP∗(E) and m(En)=m(E) for all n ≥ 1.H e n c e ,
being
T
n≥1 En ∈ Σ,a n d
T












=0 . Hence, there exists some set B ⊆ E such that both
m(B) 6=0and m(E − B) 6=0 ,a n ds om is non-atomic.
Therefore, under both hypotheses on m, m is strongly continuous. Conse-
quently, by the Lyapunov Theorem, the range R(P,m) of (P,m):Σ → RN+1
is a convex subset of RN+1.S e tW = span(R(P,m)) and let
RP(A) = {x ∈ R :( P (A),x) ∈ R},
where A is the set of Eq. (8). By Eq. (8), RP(A) = {m(A)}.H e n c e ,
by Theorem 6.8 of [21], (P (A),m(A)) ∈ ri(R). In turn, this implies
that (0,1) / ∈ span(R). For, suppose to the contrary that (0,1) ∈ W.
Since (P (A),m(A)) ∈ ri(R(P,m)),t h e r ei st>0 small enough so that
(P (A),m(A)) + t(0,1) ∈ R(P,m). Since this contradicts Eq. (8), we con-
clude that (0,1) / ∈ W.
By a standard separation theorem (see, e.g., Corollary 11.4.2 of [21]),
there is π ∈ RN+1 and α ∈ R such that, for all y ∈ W,
π • y<α < π • (0,1).
36As 0 ∈ W, α > 0.H e n c e , π • (0,1) > α > 0 implies πN+1 > 0.M o r e o v e r ,
since W is a vector space, for each y ∈ W we have π •(λy) < α for all λ > 0.
Then π • y ≤ 0, which implies π • y =0 . Therefore, for all (P (E),m(E)) ∈
R(P,m) we have πN+1m(E)+
PN
i=1 πiPi(E)=0 , and we conclude that
m ∈ span{P1,...,PN},w i t hc o e ﬃcients {−(πi/πN+1)}
N
i=1.
It is easy to check that R(P) is full dimensional if and only if the charges
{Pi}
N









∩W = ∅.B yn o w ,i ti s
easy to see that, by applying a standard separation result on these two closed
and disjoint convex sets, we can ￿nd a vector π ∈ RN+1 with πi/πN+1 ≤ 0
for all i = 1,...,N,a n ds u c ht h a tπN+1m(E)+
PN
i=1 πiPi (E)=0 .H e n c e ,
m ∈ cone{P1,...,PN}.
A.8 Corollary 23
Proof. In view of Theorem 21, it suﬃces to prove that radially concave
measure games admit radial and linear sets. Suppose ￿rst that P (E) 6=
P (Ec). By the Lyapunov Theorem, for each α ∈ (0,1) there exists Eα ∈ Σ
such that P (Eα)=αP (E)+( 1 − α)P (Ec). Therefore, using (13),
ν (Eα)=g (P (Eα)) = g (αP (E)+( 1 − α)P (E
c))






α)) = g ((1 − α)P (E)+αP (E
c))
≥ (1 − α)g (P (E)) + αg(P (E
c)).
Hence, ν (Eα)+ν (Ec
α) ≥ ν (E)+ν (Ec)=ν (Ω) ≥ ν (Eα)+ν (Ec
α) because
core(ν) 6= ∅,a n ds oe a c hEα is linear and radial. If P (E)=P (Ec),t h e n
P (E)=( 1/2)P (Ω) and so it is the center of symmetry of R(P) and it
belongs to ri(R(P)).H e n c e ,E itself is linear and radial.







Since g is concave on G, it is Lipschitzian relative to the compact set R(P)
(see, e.g., [21] Theorem 10.4), and so condition (ii) of Theorem 21 and Corol-
lary 23 holds. Let δ (x) be the appropriate indicator function of R(P) for
37our setting, de￿ned by
δ (x) ≡ δ(x | R(P)) =
‰
0 x ∈ R(P)
−∞ x/ ∈ R(P)
Set e g (x)=g (x)+δ(x) for each x ∈ G. Clearly, ∂e g (x)=∂g|R(P) (x) for
all x ∈ R(P).S i n c e g is concave, by a well-known result (see, e.g., [21]
Theorem 23.8), ∂e g(x0)=∂g (x0)+ ∂δ(x0) for all x0 ∈ G. As well-known,
∂δ(x0)=
'
χ ∈ RN : χ • x0 ≤ χ • x for all x ∈ R(P)
“
.L e t x0 ∈ ri(R(P))
and let w ∈ W,w h e r eW = span(R(P)).T h e r ei sε > 0 such that x0+εw ∈
R(P),a n ds oχ•w ≥ 0 for all χ ∈ ∂δ(x0).S i n c eW is a vector subspace, this
implies χ•w =0for all χ ∈ ∂δ(x0), which in turn implies that ∂δ(x0) ⊆ W ⊥.
Since the converse inclusion is obvious, we conclude that ∂δ(x0)=W ⊥.
Putting everything together, we have ∂g|R(P) (x0)=∂g (x0)+W⊥ for all
x0 ∈ ri(R(P)). Hence, given any χ ∈ ∂g|R(P) (x0),t h e r ei sχ0 ∈ ∂g (x0)
such that χ • P = χ0 • P.S i n c e ∂g (x0) ⊆ ∂g|R(P) (x0),t h i si m p l i e st h a t '
χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g|R(P) (P (A))
“
= {χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g (P (A))}. A simple applica-
tion of Corollary 23 now completes the proof.
A.10 Proposition 25
Suppose core(ν) 6= ∅. T h i si m p l i e st h a t∂g (P (A)) ∩ ∂g (P (Ac)) 6= ∅
because, by Theorem 21, core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)) ∩ ∂g (P (Ac))}.
Moreover, since P (A) ∈ ri(R(P)), by a well-known result of Convex Analy-
sis, [∇g (P (A)) − χ] • w =0for each χ ∈ ∂g (P (A)) and each w ∈ W,
where W = span(R(P)). Hence, ∇g (P (A)) • P (•)=χ • P (•) for each
χ ∈ ∂g(P (A)), and so, by Lemma 3, ∇g(P (A))•P (•) ∈ ∂ν(A). Since in [12]
it is proved that δν(•;A)=∇g (P (A))•P (•),w et h e nh a v eδν(•;A) ∈ ∂ν(A).
By Theorem 12, core(ν)={δν(•;A)}, as desired. Next, suppose that g is
diﬀerentiable and superdiﬀerentiable at both P (A) and P (Ac). By proceed-
ing as before, it can be shown that δν(•;Ac) ∈ ∂ν(Ac). Hence, by Theorem
12, core(ν) ⊆ {δν(•;Ac)},a n ds ocore(ν) 6= ∅ implies δν(•;A)=δν(•;Ac),
i.e., ∇g(P (A)) = ∇g (P (Ac)). As to the converse, since δν(•;A) ∈ ∂ν(A)
and δν(•;Ac) ∈ ∂ν(Ac), the equality δν(•;A)=δν (•;Ac) implies ∂ν(A) ∩
∂ν(Ac) 6= ∅. Then, by Theorem 10, core(ν) 6= ∅.
38A.11 Lemmas 28, 29, and 30
Proof of Lemma 28. (i) is obvious. As to (ii), let m1,m 2 ∈ e Γα and let
E ∈ Σ. Then, there exist m0
1,m 0
2 ∈ Γα such that m1 (E) ≥ m0
1 (E) and
m2 (E) ≥ m0
2 (E). Hence, for each t ∈ (0,1),
tm1 (E)+(1 − t)m2 (E) ≥ tm
0
1 (E)+(1 − t)m
0





The set e Γα is therefore convex. It is also immediate to check that e Γα is
closed. To show that it is w∗-compact, by the Alaoglu Theorem it is enough
to prove that e Γα is norm bounded. Given E ∈ Σ,f o re a c hm ∈ e Γα there
are m0,m 00 ∈ Γα such that m0 (E) ≤ m(E) ≤ m00 (E) (consider E and Ec).
Hence, supm∈e Γα |m(E)| =s u p m∈Γα |m(E)| < ∞ and e Γα is setwise bounded.
By a variation of the Nikodym Boundedness Theorem (see, e.g., [8] p. 80), e Γα
is then norm bounded. To prove (iii), observe that ν (E)=m i n m∈e Γα m(E)
is well de￿ned because e Γα is w∗-compact. Clearly, e Γα ⊆ core(ν).A st ot h e
converse, let m ∈ core(ν). By construction, for each E there is m0 ∈ e Γα such
that m0 (E) ≤ m(E). On the other hand, by the de￿nition of m-closure,
there is m00 ∈ Γα such that m0 (E) ≥ m00 (E),s ot h a tm(E) ≥ m00 (E).
Hence, m ∈ e Γα, and we conclude that e Γα = core(ν). The uniqueness of ν is
obvious.
Proof of Lemma 29. We ￿rst show that R is well de￿ned. Let χ,χ0 ∈ RN
be such that χ • P = χ0 • P. Then, (χ − χ0) • P (E)=0for all E ∈ Σ,a n d
so (χ − χ0) • P ∈ span(R(P))
⊥. Hence, π(χ) − π(χ0)=π (χ − χ0)=0 ,
which implies π (χ)=π (χ0).I t i s e a s y t o c h e c k t h a t R is a linear iso-
morphism. Moreover, span{P1,...,PN} with the relative w∗-topology is a
￿nite-dimensional topological vector space. Hence, by a standard result (see,
e.g., [24] p. 79), R is w∗-continuous.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 0 . By using the canonical isomorphism R,w ec a n
write m(•)=R(m) • P (•) for each m ∈ Γα. Consider the function g (x)=
minm∈Γα R(m)•x for all x ∈ RN and the associated measure game ν = g (P),
which is
ν (•)=m i n
m∈Γα
R(m) • P (•).
Clearly, ν is exact and, by Lemma 28, core(ν)=e Γα.
On the other hand, the canonical map R is continuous on the w∗-compact
set Γα, which is metrizable since it is a ￿nite-dimensional subset of ba(Ω).
39Hence, by proceeding as in the example of generalized linear production
game, we have
core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ co(R(m):R(m) • P (Ω)=ν (Ω)) = α}
= {χ • P : χ ∈ co(R(m):m ∈ Γα)} = co(R(m) • P : m ∈ Γα)
= co(Γα).
We conclude that e Γα = co(Γα), as desired.
A.12 Theorem 31
If we set Γα = core(ν), clearly (i) implies (iii). As to (iii) ⇒ (i),w eh a v e
ν (E)=m i n m∈Γα m(E) for all E ∈ Σ,a n ds oν (E)=m i n m∈e Γα m(E) for all
E. By point (iii) of Lemma 28, core(ν)=e Γα.H e n c e , ν is exact and, by
Lemma 30, core(ν) ⊆ span{P1,...,P N}. This proves that (iii) implies (i).
Set g (x)=m i n χ∈R(Γα) χ • x for all x ∈ RN. The function g : RN → R
is well de￿ned because R(Γα) is a compact subset of RN. Clearly, it is also
concave and homogeneous of degree one, and, by point (iii), ν = g (P) since
Γα = {χ • P : χ ∈ R(Γα)}. Therefore, (iii) implies (iv), and (ii) and (iii) are
equivalent.
As Lemma 30 immediately implies Eq. (14), to complete the proof it
only remains to prove the last part of the theorem. Hence, assume that
(iv) holds and set Ce = {χ ∈ ∂g(0) : χ • P (Ω)=g (P (Ω))}.D e ￿ne ge (x)=
minχ∈Ce χ • x for all x ∈ RN and νe (•)=ge (P (•)).B y c o n s t r u c t i o n , ge is
concave and homogeneous of degree one, and νe ≥ ν. Since all diagonal sets
are linear for both ν and νe, by Corollary 23,
{χ • P : χ ∈ Ce} = {χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g (0) ∩ ∂g(P (Ω))}
= core(ν) ⊇ core(νe) ⊇ {χ • P : χ ∈ Ce},
and so core(νe)=core(ν).
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